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SOLUTIONS TO U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY ACTIONS
AGAINST LATIN AMERICAN
COMPANIESt
HOMER E. MOYER, JR.* AND CATHERINE CURTISS**
This article considers U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duty laws from the viewpoint of a Latin American company, or a
U.S. company doing business with a Latin American company
which exports to the United States. In the U.S. Government's fis-
cal year 1988, the Department of Commerce initiated one hundred
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations involving 190
companies. Five percent of these new cases involved Latin Ameri-
can countries. Of all existing orders and suspension agreements,
ten percent of the antidumping cases and fifty percent of the coun-
tervailing duty cases involve Latin America.
This article will focus on the "preventive maintenance" a com-
pany can undertake to avoid or minimize U.S. antidumping or
countervailing duty liability. These preventative steps include in-
ternal auditing and monitoring programs and certain marketing
strategies. This article will also briefly address strategies for get-
ting out of an antidumping or countervailing duty trade case.
I. LATIN AMERICA AS A TARGET OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY ACTIONS
A. Summary of Past Actions
Latin America has been a frequent target of U.S. dumping and
countervailing duty actions. As of November 1, 1988, seventeen
dumping findings or orders and forty-six countervailing duty or-
t This article is taken from a speech given February 3, 1989 at the "Legal Aspects of
Doing Business in Latin America: Creative Solutions to Inter-American Legal Problems"
conference at the Hotel Intercontinental, Miami, Florida, and has not been updated.
* Member, Miller & Chevalier, Washington, D.C. Former General Counsel, United
States Department of Commerce.
** Member, Miller & Chevalier, Washington, D.C.
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ders or suspension agreements existed against Latin American
countries and products.
Cases against Brazil and Mexico account for a substantial
portion (approximately half) of the total cases involving Latin
America. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela have also been
targets. Many cases involved unfinished or semifinished steel prod-
ucts, such as pipe fittings from Brazil and wire rod from Argentina;
agricultural products, such as orange juice from Brazil and flowers
from Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere; and textile and apparel
cases, such as leather apparel, from Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay,
and Colombia. Other cases have involved products as diverse as
cement, castor oil, auto glass, toy balloons, chemicals, and cook-
ware. As the industrial bases of Latin American countries develop,
the range of exports involved in U.S. trade cases should increase.
B. Current Investigations
As of November 1, 1988, two active antidumping investiga-
tions and one active countervailing duty investigation involved
Latin America, namely pipe and tube from Argentina and steel
wheels from Brazil. There also has been a recent antidumping case
against shock absorbers from Brazil, terminated by a negative pre-
liminary injury determination in October 1988.
Most of the current cases, however, target Pacific Rim and
Western European trading partners. With changes in the laws
from the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,' the
overall number of cases may increase. Additionally, as Latin Amer-
ican economies diversify, their exports may be increasingly per-
ceived as a threat.
C. Future Possibilities
Certain products and countries are likely targets. For instance,
steel products from countries not currently party to a Voluntary
Restraint Agreement ("VRA") or a bilateral arrangement (e.g., Ar-
gentina) may be hit with a dumping or countervailing action, to
pressure those countries into a VRA.
1. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 1311-1337,
102 Stat. 1184-1211 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.)
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Processed agricultural products, particularly tropical products
and products from developing countries, may be the subject of
trade cases as an outgrowth of general concern about trade barriers
on agricultural and tropical products. Multilateral talks on these
subjects in the Uruguay Round may also spur trade cases, either as
a bargaining tool or as an alternative recourse for U.S. companies
where negotiations are not considered useful. Recent amendments
to U.S. trade laws that make it easier for growers of raw agricul-
tural products to bring cases against manufacturers of processed
products may also spur trade cases.2
Argentine soybeans, Argentine and Brazilian pharmaceutical
products, and Brazilian copper and brass semi-manufactured prod-
ucts are also candidates for antidumping or countervailing duty
cases because of Section 301 cases or petitions pending against
these products. These products may be treated much as the Japa-
nese semiconductor cases, which illustrate the potency of combin-
ing Section 301 and antidumping or countervailing duty cases to
create additional leverage for a bilateral agreement settling the
dispute.
Finally, auto parts may attract new cases, as reflected in Mexi-
can and Brazilian cases against disc wheels, steel wheels, shock ab-
sorbers, auto glass, and other products.
In analyzing vulnerability, one should keep several key factors
in mind. One factor is whether there have been antidumping or
countervailing duty cases against the same product from a differ-
ent country. For example, the U.S. pipe and tube producers filed a
countervailing duty case against pipe and tube from Brazil in 1982
and 1984, against Mexico in 1984, against Venezuela in 1985, and
against Argentina in 1988. This type of seriatim filing reflects the
"learning curve" of U.S. petitioners. It also reflects their attempt
to cover all source countries, regardless of export levels, in order to
avoid shifting of facilities or products to countries not covered by
an antidumping or countervailing duty order. Seriatim filings of
this sort may become increasingly common, because recent amend-
ments to U.S. trade laws permit "cumulation" of a relatively small
level of exports from one country with the exports of a major
source country, in determining whether a U.S. industry has been or
will be injured by dumped or subsidized imports.-
2. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677-1, 1677(4) (1988).
3. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (1988).
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A second element is whether there have been antidumping or
countervailing duty actions against a related product from the
same country. In 1983, various U.S. cement companies and the
United Cement and Lime Workers filed a countervailing duty case
against cement from Mexico. The next year, the United Cement
and Lime Workers, along with various U.S. lime companies, filed a
countervailing duty action against lime from Mexico. This kind
of pattern also doubtlessly refects a U.S. petitioner's "learning
curve," as well as the U.S. petitioner's attempt to prevent the for-
eign producer's circumvention of an order through subsequent
processing before export. "Related product" cases will likely be-
come increasingly common as prospective U.S. petitioners take ad-
vantage of recent amendments to antidumping and countervailing
duty laws dealing with "upstream subsidies, '4 "input dumping, '
and "downstream product monitoring. '
The third consideration in analyzing vulnerability is whether
there is a pending Section 301 or other trade action against the
product. Related to this factor is whether the product is a source of
controversy or political action in the United States, short of a
trade case.
The fourth factor is whether the product is manufactured in a
country that has been a popular target, especially in countervailing
duty cases where programs found to be subsidies in one case may
apply to other products as well. Brazil and Mexico have plainly
suffered from this phenomenon.
A fifth element is the condition of U.S. companies that manu-
facture the product in question. If these companies are closing
plants or moving offshore to remain viable, trade cases against for-
eign competitors may be viewed as helping to buy time for devel-
oping an improved product or building market share.
A sixth factor of importance is a particular company's pricing
strategy. Selling in the United States at a deep discount to gain a
toehold in the market may not only invite a dumping case, but also
may expose the company to substantial antidumping liability.
Finally, the level of market penetration of all importing coun-
tries in the relevant U.S. market is a factor indicating vulnerability
to a trade case. Although exports from one Latin American country
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1677-1(a) (1988).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1988).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1677i (1988).
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may be relatively small, if U.S. companies or workers are incensed
about high or increasing levels of imports overall, minor exporters
can become embroiled in a series of cases against many countries.
Because of the "cumulation" provisions mentioned previously, a
relatively small U.S. market share will not shield a Latin American
exporter from involvement in a trade case.
II. "PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE" TO AVOID OR MINIMIZE U.S.
ANTIDUMPING OR COUNTERVAILING DUTY LIABILITY
The best solution to U.S. trade cases is to avoid them alto-
gether, by not dumping or using government subsidies. These op-
tions, however, may not be realistic. For a company "preventive
maintenance" might thus consist primarily of internal corporate fi-
nancial controls in the form of an audit and monitoring program.
A. The Obvious Solutions
1. Avoiding Dumping
To avoid dumping, foreign manufacturers which export to the
U.S. should keep their U.S. prices no lower than their home mar-
ket prices for the same product, on a net or "ex-factory" basis. The
reason is that the U.S. Department of Commerce usually calculates
antidumping duties by comparing U.S. prices of products to prices
of the same or similar products sold in the home market or third
country all on a net or "ex factory" basis. Thus, deep discounts or
extremely lucrative sales terms to U.S. customers should be paral-
lelled by similar practices in the home market. Preferably, U.S.
prices should be higher than home market prices. Home market
prices should be lower than U.S. prices, but no lower than a fully
absorbed cost of production. If exporters have no or few home
market sales but have third country sales, they should apply this
same pricing analysis to third country sales.
These obvious solutions do not always work to prevent U.S.
dumping liability. Sometimes companies cannot tell whether they
are dumping, because U.S. dumping calculations are complex and
price disparities in the various markets may not be large. Compa-
nies may not be dumping according to the company's own account-
ing methods, but the Department of Commerce's definition and
calculation of dumping often bears little resemblance to business
reality or a particular company's way of doing business.
1989-90]
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2. Refusing Government Subsidies
The obvious solution to U.S. countervailing duty liability is to
refuse government subsidies. To do so, foreign manufacturers must
be aware of which of their government's actions or programs and
which programs in other countries, especially in Latin America,
have already been found to be subject to countervailing duties. In
this exercise, it should be noted that "government" means not only
direct government agencies but government-owned companies. It
should also be noted that "subsidies" refers not only to direct pay-
ments based on export performance, but also to loans, loan guaran-
tees, goods, and services provided at preferential rates, and to eq-
uity or capital investments in losing propositions, or in statutory
language, "on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations."'
Subsidies also refers to funds or debt forgiveness to cover operat-
ing losses and the assumption by the government of manufactur-
ing, production or distribution costs.
This obvious solution also does not always work. Reliance on
subsidies may be an integral part of a company's business plan
and, once accepted, subsidies may be difficult to eliminate.
B. Internal Antidumping Audits and Monitoring Programs
1. Purposes
An antidumping audit and monitoring program should iden-
tify which products among a company's U.S. exports may give rise
to antidumping liability under U.S. law. The audit should specifi-
cally identify the customers, pricing strategies and cost considera-
tions that create the problem. Assuming corrective action is taken,
a monitoring program should ensure no new problems develop.
Monitoring can also be used to analyze the antidumping conse-
quences of particular sales at specified prices or across-the-board
pricing changes.
2. Coverage
An effective audit and monitoring program can either cover all
products exported to the United States or just those products at
"high risk" of antidumping or countervailing duty liability. A com-
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1988).
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plete program would examine and monitor all aspects of costs and
pricing, the production process and process changes, cost account-
ing and financial reporting methods, sales transactions, and price-
related policies (e.g., rebates and discounts). Although a compre-
hensive audit may demand substantial effort, an audit monitoring
program can and should be tailored to the specific needs of the
company.
3. Timing and Sequence
An audit and monitoring program should be in place before a
company becomes involved in an antidumping or countervailing
duty case. Nonetheless, it is never too late. Companies who have
been through a U.S. trade case can put their knowledge to benefi-
cial use by developing a program to not only avert future cases, but
also to minimize the antidumping or countervailing duties assessed
on future exports of the products subject to an existing order.
It may be prudent to tackle only one product at a time. A se-
quential approach enables the company's successive audits of other
products to be informed by previous audit experiences.
a) Stage One: Assigning Responsibility
An audit typically requires imposing an additional burden on
already busy company employees, such as the comptroller, the
head of marketing, and the production manager. Company officials
who conduct the audit must have sufficient authority to require
any additional work, inspect all records, and be informed of all
company practices. The highest company management must give
them such authority and support.
b) Stage Two: Education
An audit and monitoring program requires immersing the
company team on U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty law.
All company employees should be advised that an audit and moni-
toring program will be undertaken, and their full cooperation
should be requested.
c) Stage Three: Initial Survey
An initial survey of the company's products and pricing can
1989-90]
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identify what future detailed audit work would be useful. The sur-
vey should gather at least five important pieces of information that
will shape subsequent auditing and monitoring efforts. This infor-
mation includes:
1) What products the company sells in the normal course of
business in the United States. Because antidumping duties are
based on the pricing of products sold in the United States, the pre-
cise definition of these products can significantly affect the out-
come of an antidumping case. For example, the Department of
Commerce might, although not necessarily, consider a second-qual-
ity product sold in the United States to be included in a case di-
rected at first-quality products. Because second-quality merchan-
dise is usually priced below first-quality products, the exporting
manufacturer typically would like the Department of Commerce to
ignore these sales. As another example, the Department of Com-
merce may, although again not necessarily, consider a small quan-
tity of goods sold as samples to be a valid subject of inquiry. Be-
cause such sales would also be at dramatically reduced prices,
including them in an antidumping case can hurt the exporting
company's position. Thus, an important preliminary step in an au-
dit survey is to identify precisely all products exported to U.S. cus-
tomers under any circumstances.
2) What products sold in the home market or a third country
are the same or similar to products exported to the United
States. A second step is to identify which products are sufficiently
comparable to those exported to the United States to be used in
the antidumping calculations. The Department of Commerce pre-
fers to compare prices of identical products sold in the United
States and home or third country market. If, however, a compari-
son of identical products is not possible, the Department may rely
on the prices of a similar product. In the language of the an-
tidumping law, the question is which products are most likely to be
judged as "such or similar merchandise" to the particular product
under investigation.8
3) The basis for "United States price" of each product sold
in the United States. The first half of the Department of Com-
merce's antidumping calculation is the net or "ex-factory" price at
which a product is sold to an unrelated buyer in the United States.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16) (1988).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a) (1988).
[Vol. 21:2480
U.S. ANTIDUMPING
The Department of Commerce still relies on the price to the unre-
lated U.S. customer even if there has been an intervening transfer
by the foreign manufacturer to a U.S. sales subsidiary. This situa-
tion, however, involves different pricing considerations that may
affect the outcome of the antidumping calculations. Thus, an im-
portant initial consideration is to identify the sales channels for
the products sold to the United States.
In the language of the antidumping law, the question is
whether the U.S. price of the products in question should be de-
fined as the "Purchase Price" of the merchandise, a transaction in
which the merchandise is deemed to have been sold directly from
the foreign manufacturer to the unrelated U.S. customer,1" or as
the "Exporters Sales Price" ("ESP"), a transaction in which the
merchandise is deemed sold by the related U.S. subsidiary." The
classification of U.S. sales as "Purchase Price" or "ESP" becomes
important in identifying the charges and "adjustments" applicable
to each transaction.
4) The basis for the foreign market value of the products. The
U.S. price is only one-half of an antidumping equation. The other
half is what the antidumping law calls "foreign market value"
("FMV").'2 Depending on the particular circumstances, FMV can
be based on sales prices in the country of manufacture, sales prices
in a third country market, or "constructed value," which is cost of
production plus profit. The choice of FMV can dramatically affect
the outcome of an antidumping case and is often the subject of
debate. Therefore, an initial antidumping audit survey should
identify the most likely basis for FMV for each product sold to the
United States.
5) Major transportation and selling charges. The Department
of Commerce tries to calculate what the price of the product would
be if sold at the factory gate, without amounts for transportation,
insurance, and so on. The initial audit survey should identify ma-
jor transportation expenses or sales circumstances that affect the
price of the final sale to the unrelated customer.
6) Comparison of net U.S. price and FMV of each product.
Once the initial five judgments have been made, the company can
do a "quick and dirty" comparison of the net U.S. prices and FMV
10. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (1988).
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c) (1988).
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (1988).
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for each "pair" of products, that is, the products sold to the United
States are paired with identical or similar home market or third
country sales, or constructed value. This survey should identify the
products at the highest risk of antidumping liability.
d) Stage Four: Antidumping Audit
The most logical target for a company's internal audit would
be one of the products identified by the initial survey as at a high
risk of high antidumping margins. An in-depth audit should reveal
not only the precise antidumping profile in the event of an an-
tidumping action against that product, but also problems or com-
plications in accounting procedures, financial reporting or sales
transaction processes that would apply to other U.S. exports. An
audit would essentially consist of a mock antidumping investiga-
tion and verification.
Assuming a product "pair" has been selected as the subject of
such an audit, the following basic procedures would be:
1) Selection of reporting period and identification of sales in
the period. Antidumping investigations normally cover a six-
month period, ending the month the antidumping petition is filed.
Therefore, a company's internal audit could cover up to six
months. If it is the first in-depth audit the company has conducted
and the company has never been involved in an antidumping case,
a shorter period may be more manageable. When the period is se-
lected, sales occurring within the period must be identified. This
process is often more complicated than it first appears since there
are many different stages in sales transactions where one could
consider the "sale" to have been completed. If there are two good
alternatives, such as date of invoice or date of shipment, the com-
pany might consider running parallel analyses, one including the
universe of sales as defined by one alternative date of sale, and the
other using the different universe of sales created when a different
date of sale is used.
2) Listing of all U.S. sales. To mimic an actual antidumping
investigation, the auditing company should separately list each
U.S. sale falling within the investigation period. For each transac-
tion, the list can contain up to thirty or more items concerning
that sale, including a product description, invoice number, sale
date, payment receipt date, customer code, quantity, total sales
price, unit price, freight charges, insurance charges, packing, corn-
[Vol. 21:2
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mission, rebates, credit expenses, and warranties. Identifying this
information for every U.S. sale during an investigation period com-
monly overwhelms companies involved for the first time in an an-
tidumping case. A dry run can serve the dual purpose of avoiding
or minimizing antidumping liability and preparing the company to
deal more efficiently with an actual antidumping investigation.
3) Listing all home market or third country sales or calculat-
ing constructed value. A list similar to the U.S. sales list should be
prepared for all home market or third country sales, including the
same type of breakdown of invoice price into various subsidiary
charges. If FMV is based on constructed value, then this portion of
the in-depth audit is devoted to calculating the particular cost of
production for the product in question. These calculations can be
quite complex, because a company's cost and financial accounting
records may not separately break out the cost for the particular
product or reflect other allocations required by the Department of
Commerce in an actual antidumping case.
4) Calculation of antidumping margins. The sales listings
compiled in a mock investigation are most useful if the antidump-
ing margins reflected in the listings are also calculated. If the mar-
gins on individual transactions and the weighted averages are cal-
culated, useful information can be provided concerning any weak
spots in the company's pricing policies.
5) Conducting a mock "verification." Every antidumping in-
vestigation involves a "verification," which is an audit by Depart-
ment of Commerce officials on the company premises of the docu-
ments on which the base of the sales listings are based." In a mock
investigation in an in-depth audit, it would be prudent for the
company also to undertake a mock verification.
e) Stage Five: Response and Special Follow-Up Review
A mock investigation and verification should create a wealth
of information. The resulting information then can be analyzed to
develop specific recommendations for changes in the company's
operations. Special follow-up might be warranted for particularly
troublesome practices unearthed by the audit, to ensure that
changes were implemented.
13. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (1988).
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f) Stage Six: Monitoring
Based on the results of the audit, the company may believe it
prudent to establish a continuous monitoring program. The pro-
gram can be established in any degree of detail and formality. Al-
though monitoring programs must be tailored to the needs of the
individual company, some general observations apply.
In developing a monitoring program, the company should fo-
cus on products where the risk of antidumping exposure is the
greatest. Depending on the basis for FMV, the company should de-
cide whether it needs to monitor home market or third country
prices, or production costs, or some combination.
Further, a monitoring program should observe not only price
and cost movements, but also the movements of price-related or
cost elements identified by the initial audit as significant. These
elements might include, for example, price adjustments given to
large customers, proposed changes in formal rebate or discount
programs, or credit terms given to customers in the various mar-
kets. Monitoring costs might involve a periodic assessment of
start-up costs or the trend of unusual repair costs in a plant with
high overall production costs. It might also involve scrutiny of the
effect on cost calculations of refinements in production processes.
It is important to note that the type and extent of monitoring
activities may vary from product to product. For example, a prod-
uct shown by the initial audit to have a comfortable distance be-
tween high U.S. prices and low FMV may require only an occa-
sional check on the movement of the invoice prices, whereas a
product with potentially severe antidumping margins may require
more frequent observations and closer involvement in company
practices.
To the extent possible, the monitoring program should mini-
mize the need for additional paperwork or analysis. It may be pos-
sible to use existing reports provided by production or sales groups
in the normal course of business. It may also deal with some issues
informally, for instance, through occasional meetings with sales,
accounting or production personnel.
4. Computerization
The Department of Commerce demands that companies com-
puterize sales listings in antidumping cases. Further, the compa-
[Vol. 21:2
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nies themselves are increasingly relying on computer-generated fi-
nancial records. Depending on the company's circumstances, it
may be sensible to develop a computer model with varying degrees
of complexity for an antidumping monitoring program.
5. Record-keeping
The previous discussion of audit and monitoring efforts pre-
sumed that maintenance of a company's sales, financial, produc-
tion, inventory, and accounting records can be significant elements
in efforts to minimize potential antidumping liability. These
records can be maintained in ways that will potentially improve
the result of an antidumping investigation and the company's abil-
ity to respond quickly and effectively in the event of an antidump-
ing investigation. In no event should existing documents be altered
as a result of an antidumping audit. However, an audit could sug-
gest changes in format or content that may be prudent for future
documents.
6. Customs Documentation
Another useful element in a preventive maintenance program
is the coordination of a company's audit and monitoring efforts
with its importer or customs broker. One purpose of such coordina-
tion is to ensure that all imports are classified correctly. For exam-
ple, a company's products may be imported under a broad or "bas-
ket" category under the Harmonized Tariff Schedules ("HTS"). A
dumping case may be brought against a different product imported
under the same HTS number, potentially causing difficulty at the
U.S. border for the innocent exporter. This difficulty can be
avoided if there is a more specific and correct classification of the
company's export under a different HTS number.
A second purpose of coordination might be to ensure that the
product's entry documents specify the value of a particular input
in final product, if that input has been the subject of other an-
tidumping cases or may be the subject of an antidumping case
against the country in question. This separate identification helps
to ensure that in the case of an antidumping order on the input,
the duty is based only on the value of the input, not on the value
of the entire product. Other peculiarities in a company's situation
may make it worthwhile to include customs considerations as part
of an antidumping audit.
1989-901
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C. Internal Countervailing Duty Audits and Monitoring
Programs
The purposes and procedures of an internal corporate counter-
vailing duty audit are similar to those of an antidumping audit.
Obviously, it is important for company officials to know what con-
stitutes a subsidy under U.S. countervailing duty law. Company of-
ficials should also be familiar with what specific government pro-
grams have been found to be subject to countervailing duties, both
in their country and in neighboring countries that have similar
economies.
A fundamental purpose of an initial audit survey is to identify
actual or potential subsidies being used by a company. An in-depth
audit would focus on these actual or potential subsidies and calcu-
late the probable benefit to the company in the most recent fiscal
year. This calculation would be the best indication of the counter-
vailing duty rate that would be assessed if a case were brought,
because countervailing duty calculations would likely be based on
the most recent calendar year.
As with an antidumping audit, an in-depth countervailing
duty audit is effective only if followed by specific recommendations
that are then acted upon. For example, it may be possible for a
company to reduce its countervailing duty exposure by negotiating
a higher interest rate on a preferential government loan. The op-
tions available to any particular company depend on the circum-
stances uncovered in the audit.
The extent to which any follow-up monitoring program would
be useful also depends on the company's particular circumstances.
Monitoring may be useful to ensure that loan repayments are
made on time and in full, and if not, that some additional penalty
amount is assessed by the sponsoring government institution. A
monitoring program might be useful to ensure that a subsidy-free
company remains so. Company employees involved in monitoring
would therefore review all new loans and other proposed financial
arrangements to ensure that countervailing duty liability is not be-
ing created.
A monitoring program can also be more extensive. It could in-
volve computer modeling, which might compare the company's
sales levels with the benefit from a particular program perceived to
be a subsidy subject to countervailing duties. Because a counter-
vailing duty rate essentially consists of the amount of benefit di-
[Vol, 21:2
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vided by the level of sales, such a monitoring program would warn
in advance of potentially high countervailing duty exposure.
A countervailing duty action involves government-wide pro-
grams and the government as a respondent. The most effective au-
dit and monitoring program thus should be done in cooperation
with the government agencies involved in administering programs
found or perceived to be subject to countervailing duties.
III. MARKETING STRATEGIES TO AVOID OR MINIMIZE LIABILITY:
WHAT DOES AND DOES NOT WORK
A. Timing of Entry into United States Markets
The timing of exports to the United States is perhaps the
most helpful marketing strategy to avoid or minimize antidumping
and countervailing duty liability. Timing is helpful because it can
significantly affect duty calculations and is under the control of the
company.
On the antidumping side, a company ideally would not begin
exporting to the United States until it had established a market
for the same product in the manufacturing country or in a third
country. This strategy allows FMV to be based on the sales prices
in one of those markets, and not on constructed value.
Timing strategy can be further refined. A large sale to a cus-
tomer in the United States at a deep discount will not necessarily
give rise to antidumping liability if the company can simultane-
ously sell the same product at a comparable price and quantity in
the home market or a third country. A note of caution, however, is
that in an antidumping case the Department of Commerce nor-
mally calculates a weighted average FMV over the entire six month
investigation. Thus, a single sale at low prices, even in a quantity
comparable to a large sale in the United States, may still not be
significant enough to lower FMV sufficiently to avoid liability.
On the countervailing duty side, a subsidized product's entry
into the U.S. market ideally should not be undertaken until the
company has achieved a relatively high level of sales of the prod-
uct. The reason is that, in general, the amount of countervailing
duty is calculated as the amount of the benefit divided by the
value of sales. If the product exported to the United States is
deemed to have received a domestic subsidy, the benefit is divided
by total sales. If the product received an export subsidy, benefit is
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divided by export sales. Because of this arithmetic, a company ex-
porting a subsidized product to the United States may neverthe-
less escape significant countervailing duty liability if it maintains a
sufficiently high level of export or overall sales.
B. Avoidance of Certain Suppliers and Distributors
To minimize antidumping liability, a foreign producer is well
advised to stay away from distribution channels in the United
States known for aggressive price cutting. Avoiding overcompeti-
tive distributors serves two purposes: minimizing the likelihood of
an antidumping case being brought, and decreasing the company's
exposure in an actual case, if the offending distribution channel
consists of related companies.
On the countervailing duty side, a company is well advised to
avoid, if possible, suppliers of major inputs that have already been
found to be subsidized. Incorporating such a countervailed input
into the product exported to the United States could lead to the
allegation of an "upstream subsidy" under relatively new provi-
sions in the countervailing duty law."' To illustrate, the Depart-
ment of Commerce initiated an "upstream subsidy" investigation
in the countervailing duty investigation of steel wheels from Brazil,
based on the steel input of hot-rolled sheet. Before the entry of a
VRA on steel from Brazil, hot-rolled sheet from Brazil was the
subject of a countervailing duty order. 5
C. U.S. Sales Offices and Shipment Arrangements
Establishing a sales office in the United States will not avoid a
countervailing duty or antidumping case. A sales office in the
United States should not affect countervailing duty liability at all.
It may affect antidumping calculations, however, because sales
through a U.S. office may create ESP rather than Purchase Price
transactions. As a general rule, ESP transactions result in higher
antidumping margins than transactions treated as Purchase Price
sales. Thus, in assessing the business reasons for distributing
through an office in the United States, a company should also care-
fully analyze potential antidumping consequences.
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(e) (1988).
15. Countervailing Duty Order; Certain Carbon Steel Products from Brazil, 49 Fed.
Reg. 25,655 (1984).
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Antidumping and countervailing duty orders cover all exports
of the particular product in question from the particular country
named, even if the merchandise is transshipped through a third
country. 16 Transshipment will thus not avoid liability under U.S.
trade laws.
Moreover, a company cannot avoid antidumping or counter-
vailing duty liability by shipping a product to a third country for
the purpose of making minor alterations, at least if an antidump-
ing or countervailing duty order already applies to the product.
17
Minor alterations (such as packaging) that might take place before
an antidumping or countervailing duty order is in effect also do not
remove products from the scope of an investigation. 18
Another strategy, attempted without success, is minor process-
ing in the United States of a product subject to an antidumping or
countervailing duty order in its finished state.1 Both case prece-
dent and recent amendments to U.S. statutory law bring such
U.S.-processed products within the scope of antidumping and
countervailing duty orders.
D. Business Relations with U.S. Producers
Establishing a business relationship with a competing U.S.
producer as a supplier or a joint venture partner may be useful for
business reasons, but has not historically avoided antidumping or
countervailing duty actions. For example, the petitioner in a recent
antidumping case involving microdisks from Japan was, at the
time of the antidumping petition, involved in a joint venture with
a Japanese company. In another case, in an antidumping case in-
volving ethyl alcohol from Brazil, the petitioner itself was a major
purchaser of the Brazilian ethanol.
Nevertheless, business relations with U.S. producers may be
helpful in two ways. A business relationship establishes a reservoir
of goodwill that may diminish U.S. industry support for bringing
an antidumping or countervailing duty case. Furthermore, if one or
16. See, e.g., Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value; Color Picture Tubes
from Japan, 52 Fed. Reg. 44,171, 44,172 (1987).
17. 19 U.S.C. § 1677j (1988).
18. E.g., Certain In-Shell Pistachios from Iran, Final Determination of Sales at Less
than Fair Value, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,919, 18,920 (1986).
19. See Gold Star Co. v. United States, 692 F. Supp. 1382 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); 19
U.S.C. § 1677j (1988).
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more U.S. producers do bring a case, other U.S. producers with
significant business relationships with the foreign respondents in-
volved may be willing to oppose the petition and jeopardize the
standing of the petitioner.
I
E. U.S. Political Connections
Even excellent U.S. political connections cannot guarantee
that an antidumping or countervailing duty case will be avoided,
settled or won. Although there have been exceptions in highly visi-
ble and large cases, most cases are unaffected by political interven-
tion by members of Congress, embassies or political appointees.2 0
IV. GETTING OUT OF THE CASE
Once a company is in an antidumping or countervailing duty
case, it is difficult to get out.
A. Antidumping Investigations
Although not commonly used, there are several procedures
available for terminating an antidumping case. Such procedures
are exclusion, termination, suspension, and revocation.
1. Exclusion
A respondent can be excluded from an antidumping investiga-
tion, but only after filing a questionnaire response demonstrating
no "dumped" sales in the investigation period. An exclusion deter-
mination is normally not made until after the response has been
verified and a final determination made.2 1 As a practical matter,
companies do not consider exclusions appealing and the Depart-
ment of Commerce rarely grants them.
2. Termination
An antidumping investigation can be terminated as to all re-
spondents by withdrawal of the petition.2 Situations where termi-
20. But see section IV(A)(3), infra.
21. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.45 (1988).
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(a) (1988).
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nation has been allowed have generally involved the entry of a
VRA by the government of the foreign exporter involved, such as
in the Brazilian steel cases. Since this option involves all respon-
dents as well as the foreign government, it is rarely used.
3. Suspension
Some antidumping cases have been suspended through the en-
try of a suspension agreement before the final determination. As of
the date of this article, there were six such cases (none involving
Latin American countries), compared to a total of 166 pending an-
tidumping orders or findings-a suspension rate of less than five
percent. Detailed statutory procedures govern the entry and moni-
toring of suspension agreements and require exporters who account
for substantially all of the imports involved to enter into the agree-
ment.28 Normally, the exporters agree to eliminate "dumped" sales
or cease exporting to the United States. These agreements are not
common in antidumping proceedings because of the difficulty of
reaching an agreement among all the parties, as well as the admin-
istrative burden of monitoring an agreement to eliminate sales at
"dumped" prices. Whatever the reasons, the Department of Com-
merce is generally perceived as reluctant to enter antidumping sus-
pension agreements, and appears to overcome its reluctance only
in response to significant political pressure.
4. Revocation
After an antidumping order is issued, a respondent can obtain
revocation based on the absence of "dumped" sales for at least two
years or on "changed circumstances. ' 24 Changed circumstances
typically occur when there has been a VRA or some other arrange-
ment limiting imports. A revocation also typically includes a ques-
tionnaire response and verification, and historically has taken sev-
eral years to finalize.
B. Countervailing Duty Investigations
The same four options permit a company to extract itself from
a countervailing duty case, but with greater ease.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(b)-(k) (1988).
24. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b),(c) (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 353.54 (1988).
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1. Exclusion
It is easier for a countervailing duty respondent to obtain ex-
clusion from an order than it is for an antidumping duty respon-
dent. Essentially, a firm desiring exclusion need only show that it
does not benefit from the subsidy alleged or found. 5
2. Termination
The circumstances under which a countervailing duty investi-
gation may be terminated parallel those conditions under which an
antidumping investigation may be terminated.2"
3. Suspension
The key difference between getting out of a countervailing
duty case as opposed to an antidumping case lies in the greater
availability of suspension agreements in a countervailing duty case.
Like its antidumping counterpart, detailed statutory procedures
also govern the entry and monitoring of countervailing duty sus-
pension agreements.2 7 Normally, suspension agreements are based
on a commitment to eliminate or offset the subsidy or cease all
exports of the product in question. Suspension agreements are
much more common in a countervailing duty case, partly because
the Department of Commerce can negotiate them with the govern-
ment/respondent that is the primary target of the case. It is also
simpler to monitor the elimination of all exports or cessation of a
particular government program than it is to monitor the cessation
of sales at dumped prices. As of the date of this article, there were
seventeen suspended countervailing duty cases, compared to sev-
enty-five pending countervailing duty orders-a suspension rate of
approximately twenty-five percent.
4. Revocation
Revocation of a countervailing duty order as to a particular
company can also be obtained under parallel circumstances to
those applicable in an antidumping case.2
25. See 19 C.F.R. § 355.38 (1988).
26. See 19 C.F.R. § 355.30 (1988).
27. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671c (1988).
28. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b),(c) (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 355.42 (1988).
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V. CONCLUSION
Overall, then, the only sure "solution" to antidumping and
countervailing duty actions by the United States against Latin
American countries is to avoid the pricing and other financial cir-
cumstances that give rise to liability. These options may not be
realistic, however. A more practical solution is preventive mainte-
nance, consisting primarily of internal antidumping and counter-
vailing duty audit and monitoring programs, with some involve-
ment by the foreign government.
